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INTRODUCTION 
This paper contributes to the understanding of the complex interface between 
globalisation and labour standards by focussing on the effects of employment 
protection on the international location of economic activity.   
In the past few decades the liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
policies worldwide has led to an increase in the ease with which firms (and jobs) 
move across national borders.  As a result, governments’ rhetoric and policies 
increasingly betray concerns about their countries’ ability to prevent domestic 
industry from relocating abroad and to attract and/or retain foreign investment.   
Labour market institutions are commonly regarded as crucial in determining 
the location of economic activity, not least if they influence the flexibility with which 
firms can adjust output scale and employment levels to evolving economic conditions.  
Employment protection laws in particular are identified as a major source of 
inflexibility1 since, by forcing them to under-produce during economic booms and 
over-produce when the economy slows down, high hiring and firing costs undermine 
firms’ ability to adapt to fast changing competitive markets.2 This view is supported 
by empirical work that finds that firms in countries characterised by a high degree of 
employment protection are less likely to reduce output after a negative shock (e.g. 
Bertola et al 2010).3  Not only are the rigidities resulting from employment protection 
held responsible for the poor employment performance of many European countries 
(e.g. Lindbeck and Snower 1988; and Lazear 1990)4, but also for hindering countries’ 
ability to hold on to footloose industries. In particular, the substantial differences that 
exist between economies, even within the European Union, in hiring and firing 
restrictions5 are seen as a source of unfair ‘competitive advantage’ for those locations 
                                                 
1  See, for instance, the OECD report (2004) that states that ‘Laws on firing or layoffs and other 
employment protection regulations are thought by many to be a key factor in generating labour market 
“rigidity” …’.  
2 Several authors argue employment responses to shocks and/or the business cycle to be smaller when 
employment protection is higher (e.g. Bertola and Rogerson 1997; Garibaldi 1998; Messina and 
Vallanti 2007). 
3 In earlier work, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) find that firing costs are likely to have reduced 
employment variation in Europe. 
4 However, Nickell (1998) finds that hiring and firing restrictions typically do not have a decisive role 
on overall rates of unemployment.  
5 The OECD Employment Protection index (2008) ranges from 1.09 and 1.39 in the UK and Ireland 
respectively to 3.11 and 3.39 in Spain and Luxembourg respectively. 
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with lower employment adjustment costs6 and, increasingly, recommendations are put 
forward that the state-mandated redundancy payments – that were introduced in many 
European countries from the late 1950s to the early 1970s – are dismantled. 
In this paper our aim is to study the effects of inflexibilities arising from 
employment protection on firms’ location decisions. 7 We address this issue by 
focussing on firms’ location decisions when the prospective host countries are 
developed countries with quite similar labour costs but differences in labour market 
legislations. 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that the effects of employment protection 
on the location decision of multinational corporations are not that clear-cut. The 
majority of the empirical work on this issue focuses on the relationship between a host 
country’s employment legislation and its inward FDI.  Cooke (1997) finds that host 
countries’ restrictive legislation governing layoffs have had a negative effect on US 
FDI abroad.  Moran (1998) summarises evidence from investor surveys and mentions 
labour regulations, in particular “flexibility in hiring and laying off workers”, as one 
of the main concerns for firm location in transition and developing economies.  More 
recently, Nicoletti et al (2003) and Görg (2005) also find evidence that employment 
protection can have a negative effect on inward FDI. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) 
obtain results that suggest that, other things being equal, the more flexible a FDI host 
country’s labour market is relative to that in the source country, the higher the 
probability of inward FDI taking place. They also find that labour market flexibility 
matters more for firms in the service sector than in manufacturing. Haaland et al 
(2002) find that western MNEs locating in Eastern Europe tend to prefer locations 
with more flexible labour markets. However, Leibrecht and Scharler (2009) find that 
while FDI flows are higher in countries with lower unit labour costs, hiring and firing 
rigidities do not have statistically significant effects on FDI flows. Dewit, Görg and 
Montagna (2009) examined the relationship between employment protection and 
outward FDI and find that a high domestic level of employment protection tends to 
discourage outward FDI, suggesting that strict employment protection in a firm’s 
                                                 
6 In a theoretical paper, Cuñat and Melitz (2012) show how international differences in labour market 
regulations can indeed generate a comparative advantage. 
7  As such, we are not concerned with studying the general existence of inflexibilities in inter-temporal 
output adjustments (as is the case in Lapham and Ware 1994 and Jun and Vives 2004; note that these 
papers are not concerned with firms’ location decisions). 
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home country makes it reluctant to relocate abroad and thus keeps domestic firms 
“anchored” at home. 
In this paper, we contend that labour market inflexibility may not necessarily 
hinder a country’s ability to attract and/or retain economic activity. Our argument is 
that if employment protection is a source of inflexibility and if firms have market 
power (as is likely to be the case for most MNEs which are typically larger than other 
firms), then employment protection can also plausibly be a source of commitment. 
This view finds theoretical support in the strand of the industrial organisation 
literature that emphasises how commitment (i.e. inflexibility) is a source of strategic 
advantage and suggests that the effects of employment protection on the location of 
industry may be more nuanced than what is maintained by the conventional view that 
countries with less stringent employment protection are more attractive to 
internationally mobile firms.  We shall therefore investigate how region-specific 
flexibility affects location decisions when firms are oligopolistic and act 
strategically.8  In a non-strategic set-up, flexibility only entails advantages for a firm.  
This is not necessarily true when firms act strategically, since flexibility then implies 
lack of commitment power. To capture the effects of flexibility versus those of 
commitment we develop a model in which oligopolistic firms play a two-period three-
stage game. The first time period is divided into a location setting stage and a market 
stage. Specifically, in period one, production locations are chosen in the first stage of 
the game.  In stage two, firms observe the location decisions and set period-one 
market actions (outputs under Cournot and prices under Bertrand) given period one 
demand but with uncertainty about period two’s demand. In period two which 
coincides with stage three, the uncertainty regarding that period’s demand is resolved 
and firms choose their market actions for that period. The multi-stage feature of the 
game implies that actions taken in earlier stages are observed by rivals when they are 
choosing their actions at later stages of the game. Thus, firms’ earlier actions can 
strategically affect rivals’ behaviour in later stages.9  Firms producing in locations 
                                                 
8 The inflexibility resulting from employment protection is conceptually different from the rigidities 
resulting from other sources, such as, for instance, capital cost adjustments.  Employment protection 
adjustment costs are location-specific rather than firm-specific, i.e., they are common to all firms in a 
given location – and a firm changing location would face different degrees of inflexibility in the 
presence of inter-country differences in employment protection.   
9 One can contrast this with the open-loop equilibrium, which is often considered to be a useful 
theoretical benchmark for comparison.  In that case, firms would not observe their rival’s actions when 
choosing their own. Instead, one should think of all the actions being chosen simultaneously.  Then, 
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where employment is less flexible may benefit from the potential advantages obtained 
by the commitment power that such inflexibility implies.  
Our analysis will be driven by two substantive questions.  First, could 
location-specific sources of inflexibility create strategic advantages that affect local 
anchorage of domestic firms as well as a country’s ability to attract production of 
internationally mobile firms?  To explore the relationship between employment 
protection and firm location, we combine ideas from different strands of the literature, 
and apply these to a set-up in which firms’ locations are endogenous.  By emphasising 
the effect of oligopolistic interaction on the relationship between employment 
protection and the location of industry our paper fills an important gap in the 
literature.   Second, we ask when we can expect to find strategic clustering in the 
same regions and when strategic geographical dispersion is more likely.  In 
addressing this question, the paper complements the economic geography literature, 
which is mainly concerned with agglomeration formation in non-strategic set-ups.10  
The paper also contributes to the theoretical literature on FDI.   A large body 
of the theoretical work on firm location has focussed on market access and local costs 
of production as the central determinants of a country’s ability to attract FDI and 
retain domestic firms.  Seminal contributions include Smith (1987) and Horstmann 
and Markusen (1987, 1992).11  In some recent work, firms with different levels of 
productivity are sorted into domestic firms, exporters and firms that do FDI (e.g., 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004). More recently, a significant body of work has 
emerged that studies the role of labour market institutions in firm location.  The bulk 
of this literature has focussed on the part played by labour unions.12  Relatively less 
explored, despite its prominence in policy debates, is the relationship between 
employment protection and firm location.  Notable exceptions are Haaland et al 
(2002) and Haaland and Wooton (2007) who analyse the location decision of a single 
multinational choosing between a more and a less flexible location.  These papers, 
however, focus on the monopoly case and thus abstract from issues of strategic 
                                                                                                                                            
there is no incentive to strategically affect rivals’ actions (Tirole 1988 provides a detailed explanation 
of the difference between a multistage game and the open-loop benchmark).  While a useful device for 
theoretical comparison, this hypothetical benchmark would, of course, fail to capture the intertemporal 
aspect of the issue here. 
10 See, for instance, Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). 
11 For surveys on multinationals and FDI, see Caves (1996) and  Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
12Early contributions include Bughin and Vannini (1995), Zhao (1995, 2001), and Leahy and  
Montagna (2000). 
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interaction between firms which can be influenced by the flexibility of the labour 
market.  Among  earlier papers that focus on the flexibility considerations in location 
choice, though not on the role of employment protection,  de Meza and Van der Ploeg 
(1987) and Sung and Lapan (2000) respectively consider the role of cost and 
exchange rate uncertainty in providing a rationale for setting up plants in different 
countries.   By contrast, in our paper strategic behaviour is at the forefront.  As such, 
our work is linked to the Industrial Organisation literature on adjustment costs, 
flexibility and strategic behaviour.  The effect of adjustment costs on strategic 
behaviour in the product market has been discussed in set-ups without location 
decisions (see Lapham and Ware, 1994; Jun and Vives, 2004).  In a recent paper, 
Kessing (2006) has developed a model without location choice in which, by reducing 
flexibility, employment protection acts as a commitment device that can affect a 
rival’s behaviour.  Our paper has, however, a very different focus to his.  Kessing 
considers a contest, an all-pay auction, between rival firms for a given (large-scale) 
contract. In his framework, price and quantity decisions are not modelled.  By 
contrast, our model uses a standard oligopoly framework, distinguishing between 
Cournot and Bertrand competition, and highlights the fact that the results depend on 
the mode of competition and hence on the specific features of the oligopolistic 
industry. Another key difference from Kessing is that market uncertainty is modelled 
in our set-up, which allows us to study the trade-off firms face between commitment 
and flexibility.  Furthermore, importantly, unlike Kessing (2006), our framework 
allows us to endogenise firms’ location in the context of a trade-off  between retaining 
flexibility and benefitting from commitment.  
We show that the effect of employment protection legislation on location 
patterns strongly differs depending on whether firms compete in prices or quantities.  
With quantity competition, a firm producing in a country with a relatively inflexible 
labour market (i.e., with relatively strict employment protection) has a strategic 
advantage over a rival that produces in a country with a flexible labour market (i.e., in 
the absence of employment protection), as it can use employment protection as a 
commitment mechanism to secure a large future market share at the expense of its 
flexible rival.  This makes the inflexible location strategically attractive.  When 
competing in prices, both firms will engage in strategic pricing as long as one firm is 
located in the inflexible location.  The strategic pricing of the firm in the flexible 
location harms the firm in the inflexible location and hence the flexible location 
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becomes strategically attractive: both firms locating in the flexible location eliminates 
such harmful rival strategic pricing. Thus, our model provides a theoretical rationale 
for the ambiguity that emerges from the empirical literature on the effects of 
employment protection on FDI and firm location. 
The model is presented in Section 1. The determinants of location for a 
monopolist firm are analysed in Section 2.  In Sections 3 and 4, we analyse, 
respectively, the location decisions of oligopolistic firms under Cournot and under 
Bertrand competition.  In section 5, some possible extensions of the model are 
discussed.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
I. THE MODEL 
Two firms plan to launch new products, which are imperfect substitutes, to be sold in 
an integrated market.13  One firm, the Home firm, has its headquarters in the country 
named “Home”, while the other, referred to as the Foreign firm, has its headquarters 
in the country named “Foreign”.  Each has to decide where to locate its production 
plant: either in “Home” or in “Foreign”.  We assume that the fixed costs of setting up 
a plant are sufficiently high to ensure that each firm chooses to have one plant only.  
Competition takes place during two periods, with firms choosing “actions” – outputs 
under Cournot and prices under Bertrand competition – in each period.  The 
respective demand functions for the Home and the Foreign firm for period one are 
given by 
(1a) *111 eqqap −−= , 
and 
(1b) 1
*
1
*
1 eqqap −−= .         
In period two, the firms’ respective demand functions are: 
(2a) ueqqap +−−= *222 , 
and 
(2b) ueqqap +−−= 2*2*2 ,       
                                                 
13 In order to bring out more sharply the effects on location of inter-country asymmetries in labour 
market rigidities, we choose to abstract from trade-cost jumping considerations. The effects of relaxing 
this assumption will be discussed in Section 6.2.  
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where 10 <≤ e  is an inverse measure of product differentiation14, and 0>a . The 
Home firm’s price and output are denoted by p  and q , respectively.  Variables 
referring to the Foreign firm are starred.  Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the time period.  
In period one, demand for that period is observed but there is uncertainty about future 
demand.  Hence, a stochastic component, u , enters the demand function for period 
two and is defined over the support [ , ]u u  (which is restricted to guarantee interior 
solutions), with mean Eu=0 and variance 2σ . The uncertainty is resolved at the start 
of period two.  To ensure non-negative prices, we assume },max{ 1
*
1
*
11 eqqeqqa ++≥  
and },max{ 2
*
2
*
22 eqqeqqua ++≥+ . 
We assume that the Home and Foreign country differ in one important respect.  
In Home, strict employment protection regulations prevail.  These cause firms to incur 
hiring and firing costs if, after an unexpected change in demand, they want to deviate 
from the period-one production (and hence employment) level.  By contrast, 
employment protection regulations in Foreign are lax and expansions or reductions in 
production can be carried out without incurring any adjustment costs.  The profit 
functions for the Home  and the Foreign firm are respectively given by15 
(3a) CRR −+= 21π , 
and 
(3b) **2
*
1
* CRR −+=π ,         
where tR  denotes the Home firm’s revenue in period t (with t=1,2) and C  stands for 
its total cost.  Total costs depend on the location chosen by the firm and on whether it 
engages in FDI or not.  The expressions in (4) give the cost function for each firm in 
each location: 
 
(4) 
 
 Home location Foreign location 
Home firm: C ϕ+Λ++ 21 cqcq  δϕ +++ 21 cqcq  
Foreign firm: C* δϕ ++Λ++ **2*1 cqcq  ϕ++ *2*1 cqcq  
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking, the model could allow for homogeneous products (e=1) with Cournot behaviour, 
but not with Bertrand behaviour. 
15 We assume that the discount factor is one (in subsection 6.3 we discuss the effects of a smaller 
discount factor).  
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In order to abstract from location-specific cost differences, we assume that the 
marginal cost of production (c) is the same in both locations.  It is of course possible, 
but by no means certain, that the mere presence of employment protection raises 
marginal costs – e.g. by increasing workers’ bargaining power and thus indirectly 
pushing up wages16; however, we choose to abstract from this type of effect as the 
impact on location choice of inter-country  marginal cost differences  is 
straightforward.  Adjustment costs ( Λ and *Λ ) are, however, location specific as  they 
are paid in period two only if the firm locates in the inflexible (Home) location.  
These are denoted by 212 ))(2/( qq −≡Λ λ  and 2*1*2* ))(2/( qq −≡Λ λ for the Home and 
Foreign firm, respectively.  The λ-parameter ( 0>λ ) measures the degree of 
inflexibility.  Our convex adjustment costs specification reflects the stylised fact that 
larger changes in employment levels are more expensive than smaller changes.  When 
laying off a large number of workers, a firm is more likely to lose more experienced 
and productive employees, and marginal severance costs may need to be higher when 
cutbacks are larger.  The greater the number of newly hired employees, the higher is 
the marginal cost of adjustment.  Likewise, the marginal cost of increasing working 
hours rises if overtime must be paid.17  The firm’s fixed cost of setting up a plant in its 
native country is denoted by ϕ .  However, if it locates abroad, its fixed costs are 
δϕ + , with 0>δ  representing the additional costs associated with FDI.18  These 
typically consists of what Blonigen (2006) calls “access-to-information costs”, e.g., 
information and network costs associated with setting up a plant in a foreign country 
(including dealing with foreign languages and coordination of suppliers) and 
acquiring knowledge of the local regulatory environment (such as foreign laws, a 
foreign taxation system and foreign ownership restrictions).  The parameter δ  should 
be interpreted in this broad sense.  It can be thought of as reflecting the barriers to FDI 
and will shrink as the degree of globalisation increases.  
Firms play a two-period three-stage game, acting simultaneously in each stage.  
The sequence of decisions is shown in Figure 1.  In period one, production locations, 
Home (H) or Foreign (F), are chosen (stage one).  There are four possible location 
                                                 
16 Lazear (1990) argues that in perfect labour markets severance payments do not affect wages as their  
effects can be offset by suitably designed labour contracts. Leonardi and Pica (2007) provide empirical 
support for Lazear’s theoretical results.   
17 Hamermesh (1996, Ch.6) provides a survey of employment adjustment cost specifications. 
18 This was first formalised by Hirsch (1976). 
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equilibria: two in which both firms choose the same location, (H,H) and (F,F), and 
two in which firms choose a different location, (H,F) and (F,H).  For each location 
pair, the first letter refers to the Home firm’s location choice, whereas the second 
indicates the Foreign firm’s location choice.  No FDI occurs in the (H,F)-equilibrium, 
while both firms engage in FDI in the (F,H)-equilibrium.  In stage two, period-one 
actions are determined given demand for period one but with uncertainty about 
demand in period two.  In period two, the uncertainty is resolved and firms choose 
their actions after having observed actual demand for that period (stage three).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Firms’ location decisions are influenced both by non-strategic and strategic 
factors.  The non-strategic aspects of the production location choice are examined 
first. 
 
II. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND THE LOCATION DECISION OF A 
MONOPOLIST FIRM 
To focus on the non-strategic determinants of location, we initially consider the limit 
case of e=0, when the products are no longer substitutes and so each firm becomes a 
monopolist. In the absence of strategic behaviour, only cost and flexibility 
considerations will determine firms’ location decisions. 
In period two, the firm maximises period-two profits, 2π , which is equal to 
Λ−− 22 cqR  if the firm produces in Home and is 22 cqR −  if the firm produces in 
Foreign.  Optimal period-two outputs for firms producing in Home and Foreign are, 
respectively, given by: 
(5a) λ
λ
+
++=
2
1
2
uqAq
H
H   and   
22
uAq F += ,    
with caA −≡ . 
In period one, output is determined by maximising expected profit over the 
two periods.  When the firm produces in Home, its total profit is equal to 
),,()( 12211 uqqq ππ + Φ−−−+−+−= 2122211 ))(2/()()( qqquqAqqA λ , where Φ  is 
the fixed costs incurred by the firm, which depends on whether the firm locates in its 
domestic economy ( ϕ=Φ ) or abroad ( δϕ +=Φ ); expected profits are given by 
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),,()( 12211 uqqEq ππ + .  When the firm produces in Foreign, its profit is 
),()( 2211 uqq ππ +  Φ−+−+−= 2211 )()( quqAqqA , with expected profits given by 
),()( 2211 uqEq ππ + .  Maximising expected profits with respect to 1q  and using the 
expressions in (5a) yields the same first-period output of 
(5b) 
211
Aqq FH == ,       
irrespective of where the monopolist is located.  Combining expressions (5a) and (5b), 
period-two output of a firm located in Home can be rewritten as λ++= 222
uAq H . 
To explain how a firm’s location choices are determined, it will prove useful 
to decompose expected maximised profits ( πE ) as 
(6) 0 0( ( ) ) ( )
u
u
E u f u duπ π π π= + −∫ .       
The first term of expression (6), Φ−=≡ θππ )(0 Eu , denotes deterministic profits, 
where θ  is deterministic operating profit and Φ  is the (earlier defined) fixed costs 
incurred by the firm.  The second term in (6) represents the expected profit gain from 
demand shocks.  Because maximised profits are convex in u, this term is non-negative 
and increasing in 2σ .  In fact, we are able to write 20 )())(( γσππ =−∫uu duufu , 
where γ  reflects the firm’s ability to exploit unexpected demand shocks.  Thus, 
expected maximised profits are Φ−+= 2γσθπE .  Given the costs of FDI, δ , 
locations are determined with each firm bearing in mind deterministic operating 
profits, θ , as well as expected profit gains from demand shocks, 2γσ .   
For a monopolist firm, deterministic operating profits are independent of the 
production location (i.e., 22
2
1 )()( Eqq
FH +== θθ ) since 111 qqq FH ==  and 
222 EqEqEq
FH == .  However, expected gains from flexibility are higher in Foreign 
than in Home (i.e., 4/1=Fγ  and ))2(2/(1 λγ +=H , hence HF γγ > ).  The 
monopolist’s θ- and γ-values for each location are reported in Table A.1.  
The location choice of a Foreign monopolist is intuitive: it will always 
produce in Foreign since this entails maximum flexibility without incurring the cost of 
FDI.  For a Home monopolist, the location decision involves a trade-off between the 
costs of FDI and the flexibility benefits associated with producing in Foreign.  With 
uncertainty, the firm anticipates it may face adjustment costs in Home, while there 
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will be no adjustment costs if it produces in Foreign.  High uncertainty increases the 
value of flexibility.19  Thus, when uncertainty is high and provided FDI-costs are not 
prohibitive, the Home monopolist will produce in Foreign.  There is a critical level of 
uncertainty above which the Home monopolist will choose to produce in Foreign and 
below which it will choose to locate in Home.  More specifically, the monopoly firm 
settles in Home rather than Foreign if FH EE ππ > , which implies λλδσ /)2(42 +<  
(so, in the absence of demand uncertainty, 0.2 =σ , the Home monopolist will not be 
affected by employment protection and hence has no reason to locate in Foreign).  
The critical 2σ -level is depicted as a function of λ in Figure 2. As the figure shows, 
the critical threshold decreases in the degree of labour market inflexibility in Home 
(λ).  It also increases in the FDI cost (δ ) (in terms of Figure 2, the locus shifts up as δ 
increases). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
III. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND LOCATION UNDER COURNOT 
COMPETITION 
When products are substitutes, i.e. for e > 0, firms behave as duopolists and their 
location decisions involve both strategic and non-strategic considerations.  From 
section 3 we know that Cournot and Bertrand competition both converge to the 
monopoly case at e=0.  As e increases, the strategic effects become stronger and the 
two types of oligopolistic behaviour give rise to divergent location patterns.  In this 
section, we derive the location pattern under Cournot competition; the location pattern 
for the case in which firms are Bertrand competitors will be derived in section 5.  For 
expositional clarity, we explain the nature of the strategic effects in detail in the case 
in which each firm produces domestically, that is, the Home firm produces in Home 
and the Foreign firm in Foreign (i.e., (H,F)).  The strategic behaviour in the other 
possible location equilibria will be discussed at the end of each subsection, referring 
to Table 1, which reports the strategic term in all possible location combinations.  
                                                 
19 This is in line with the real option value approach in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
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Employment protection and output decisions 
Firms’ production locations affect their market actions.  Solving the game backwards, 
we first consider the firms’ output choice in period two, in which locations and 
period-one outputs have already been chosen.  When each firm produces 
domestically, (i.e., in the (H,F)-case), period-two profits for the two firms are 
respectively: Λ−−= 222 cqRπ  and *2*2*2 cqR −=π  which are maximised with respect 
to outputs to obtain the second-period reaction functions:   
(7a) ( )λλ ++−+= 2/)( 1*22 qequAq ,  
and      
(7b) 2/)( 2
*
2 equAq −+= .         
Expressions (7a) and (7b) clearly suggest that a firm’s location has implications for its 
flexibility.  The Home firm’s reaction function responds less to unexpected demand 
shocks than its rival’s does ( uquq ∂∂<∂∂ // *22  from (7a) and (7b))20.  The firm in 
Home is also less responsive to changes in rival output (i.e., 2/)2/( ee <+ λ ).  Also, 
due to adjustment costs, the Home firm’s reaction function depends positively on its 
own past output, as captured by the term in 1q .  Solving expressions (7a) and (7b), we 
obtain:  
(8a) 2
1
2 )2(2
2))(2(
e
quAeq −+
++−= λ
λ ,  
and       
(8b) 2
1*
2 )2(2
))(2(
e
qeuAeq −+
−+−+= λ
λλ .       
We now turn to stage two of period 1.  It is useful to write the firms' profit 
functions as: 
(9a) 
   
   ϕλ
πππ
−−−−+−−+−−−=
+=
2
1222
*
2211
*
11
1
*
222
*
111
))(2/()()(
),,,(),(
qqcqqueqqacqqeqqa
uqqqqq
,   
and 
                                                 
20 As Bertola et al (2010), employment protection reduces output – and hence employment − 
variability. 
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(9b) 
     
     ϕ
πππ
−−+−−+−−−=
+=
*
2
*
22
*
2
*
1
*
11
*
1
*
22
*
2
*
11
*
1
*
)()(
),,(),(
cqqueqqacqqeqqa
uqqqq
.   
Being uncertain about the demand in period two, firms simultaneously 
determine their outputs for period one by maximising total expected profits ( πE  and 
*πE ) with respect to first-period outputs.  With ),,,(),( 1*222*111 uqqqEqqE πππ +=  
and ),,(),( *22
*
2
*
11
*
1
* uqqEqqE πππ += , and since 0
1
2
2
2 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂
dq
dq
q
E π 21, the first-order 
condition for the Home firm’s first-period output can be written more compactly as 
(10a) 0
1
*
2
*
2
2
11
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂=
dq
dq
q
E
q
E
dq
dE πππ .       
The first-order condition for the Foreign firm’s first-period output is 
(10b) 0*
1
*
*
1
*
=∂
∂=
q
E
dq
dE ππ .         
In (10a), the term in squared brackets captures the strategic effect.  This strategic term 
is positive ( 0/ 2
*
22 <−=∂∂ qqπ  and 0/ 1*2 <dqdq ), implying that the firm in Home 
strategically over-produces in period one (or, 0/ 1 <∂∂ qEπ ). Over-production has to 
be interpreted relative to a hypothetical situation in which, given firms’ location 
choices, first-period actions are not observed.  Then, in what is often called an “open-
loop” equilibrium, second-period actions cannot be contingent on first-period actions.  
In this hypothetical benchmark, firms cannot act strategically (see Tirole 1988). 
Intuitively, strategic production in period one is aimed at ensuring a large 
future market share.  By choosing a high output level in period one, the Home firm is 
forced to keep its production in the next period at a relatively high level, since 
changing its output then will be costly.  This commitment to keep production high in 
period two forces the rival firm to cut back its output.  Meanwhile, there is no 
strategic behaviour by the firm in Foreign given that there is no intertemporal link 
between the Foreign firm's output choices.22  
                                                 
21 This follows from the second-period profit optimisation by the Home firm, implying 0/ 22 =∂∂ qπ .  
Similarly, 0*
1
*
2
*
2
*
2 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂
dq
dq
q
E
π
for the Foreign firm, because 0/ *2
*
2 =∂∂ qπ . 
22 When the Foreign firm produces in Home (i.e., in the (H,H) and in the (F,H) equilibrium, the 
strategic term is positive (see table 1). 
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Evidently, the (H,F)-case is not the only possible location combination that 
can arise. Table 1 presents the strategic terms for both firms under Cournot 
competition for all possible location combinations.  If both firms engage in FDI, 
(F,H), only the Foreign firm strategically over-produces in period one.  In the cases in 
which only one firm faces adjustment costs ((H,F) and (F,H)), the firm in the 
inflexible home location has higher expected outputs and the firm in the flexible 
location has lower expected outputs than in the open loop equilibrium. However, the 
expected prices of both firms’ outputs are lower than in the open loop so that the 
equilibrium is more competitive.  If both firms produce in Foreign, (F,F), neither firm 
acts strategically.  If both firms produce in Home, (H,H), then each firm behaves 
strategically and over-produces in period one.  Our results are consistent with Jun and 
Vives (2004) who explored the strategic incentives for symmetric (i.e., each facing 
the same adjustment costs) firms only, using Markov perfect equilibria: firms facing 
symmetric adjustment costs produce higher expected outputs and hence the equilibria 
are more competitive than in the corresponding open loop equilibria. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Location patterns with employment protection  
We now turn to stage one, in which firms simultaneously choose their production 
location.  Taking the rival’s location as given, each firm selects the location that 
yields the highest expected profits. As in the monopoly case, expected profits can be 
decomposed into fixed costs, Φ , deterministic operating profits, θ , and the expected 
profit gains from the demand shocks, 2γσ .  Unlike under monopoly and due to 
strategic interaction between the firms, the value of a firm’s θ  depends not only on its 
own location but also on the location of its rival.    
Under Cournot competition, the Home firm’s deterministic operating profits at 
the different location combinations are ranked as follows: 
(11a) FHHHFFHF θθθθ >>> .        
while the ranking for the Foreign firm is given by 
(11b) HFHHFFFH **** θθθθ >>> .        
where the first superscript refers to the location of the Home firm and the second one 
indicates the location of the Foreign firm.  The derivations of θ and γ  are given in 
Appendix A and the θ- and γ-values for each location combination are reported in 
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table A.1. We will now provide some insights into this θ -ranking, which is solely 
determined by the strategic behaviour of firms.23  Under Cournot competition, given 
its rival’s location choice, a firm always attains higher deterministic operating profits 
θ  at the inflexible location than at the flexible location because at the latter it is able 
to strategically commit to higher output. The firm thus obtains a gain in market share 
in both periods if its rival is flexible (resulting in the rankings FFHF θθ >  and 
FFFH ** θθ > ) and avoids a loss in market share if its rival is inflexible (leading to 
FHHH θθ >  and HFHH ** θθ > ).   However, if both firms are in the inflexible location 
(H,H), the game has a prisoner’s dilemma character, with firms producing higher 
output than when both firms produce in the flexible location (F,F).  In ),( HH , both 
firms’ first-period strategic overproduction (see table 1) merely results in lower prices 
compared to (F,F); that is, deterministic operating profits are lower for both firms 
than in ),( FF , when firms do not act strategically. Thus, HHFF θθ >   and 
HHFF ** θθ > .  
The value of γ , which reflects the ability of firms to make use of flexibility to 
deal with demand shocks, also depends on the location combination.  Obviously, for 
both firms this ability to exploit demand shocks is higher in ),( FF  than in ),( HH  
(formally HHFF γγ > and HHFF ** γγ > ).  Furthermore, a firm’s γ  is largest when it is 
flexible and its rival is located in the inflexible location: it then is the only firm that 
can fully adjust to unexpected shocks. Its expected profit gain from demand shocks is 
then largest (thus FFFH γγ > and FFHF ** γγ > ).  Conversely, a firm’s γ  is smallest 
when it is inflexible and its rival is fully flexible.  Given the above pair-wise rankings, 
the full ranking of the γ -parameters in the different location combinations for the 
Home and Foreign firm is given respectively by: 
(12a) HFHHFFFH γγγγ >>> ,        
and  
(12b) FHHHFFHF **** γγγγ >>> .        
The analysis of the firm’s location decisions involves many unwieldy 
algebraic expressions and we provide the detailed formal analysis in Appendix B.  In 
                                                 
23 In the open-loop benchmark in which, given firms’ location choices, first-period actions are not 
observed and firms cannot set output strategically, the θ-values for every location combination would 
be the same. 
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the text, to ease the exposition, we shall illustrate all the qualitatively different cases 
that can arise from different parameter combinations using relatively few diagrams. 
The figures are depicted in ),( 2 λσ -space, which means that they are drawn at given 
values of δ and e. We distinguish between two qualitatively different cases, depending 
on whether the FDI cost δ is high or low.  First, we focus on a situation in which FDI 
costs are sufficiently high for the foreign firm always to remain located in its own 
country (subsection 4.2.1). This allows us to discuss in detail the home firm’s choice 
between locating at home in the inflexible market or going abroad in search of 
flexibility. Second, we shall explore how increasing degrees of globalisation (in the 
form of falling values of δ) influence location patterns (subsection 4.2.2).  In contrast 
to the FDI-cost, the degree of product differentiation (captured by the reciprocal of e) 
tends not to affect location patterns in a qualitatively significant way. We will briefly 
comment on the effects of e as we examine each case. 
 
Domestic anchorage   Suppose that the fixed costs associated with FDI are so high 
that any potential strategic advantage to the Foreign firm of locating in Home would 
be dominated by the FDI-costs.  Then, the Foreign firm will, even under certainty, 
produce in Foreign.  Furthermore, as in the monopoly case, an increase in uncertainty 
increases the attractiveness of the Foreign location because of its flexibility 
advantages.  Given that the Foreign rival produces in Foreign, we then need to 
examine where the Home firm will locate.   
Figure 3a shows the location pattern that emerges in ),( 2 λσ -space.  The 
negatively sloped locus represents the threshold uncertainty level at which the Home 
firm is indifferent between locating in Home and in Foreign, given that the Foreign 
firm will stay in Foreign, defined by 
*
2
F
σ  (for ease of comparison, the threshold 
uncertainty level at which a monopolist Home firm is indifferent between locating in 
Home and in Foreign is represented by the faint locus).  In area I, the Home firm 
locates in home: it remains “domestically anchored”.  Note that this area includes the 
special case of certainty (i.e., at 02 =σ , which is along the horizontal axis); clearly, in 
the absence of uncertainty there is no longer a flexibility disadvantage from the 
existence of employment protection at home, but the strategic advantage associated 
with it remains.  Thus, employment protection generates dynamic strategic effects 
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even in the absence of uncertainty’. However, when both uncertainty and domestic 
employment protection are sufficiently high (area II), the Home firm decides to 
produce in Foreign. 
 
[Figures 3a, 3b and 3c about here] 
 
As product differentiation increases (i.e., as e falls), the area with domestic 
anchorage shrinks.  The reason for this lies in the fact that product differentiation 
weakens competition between firms and hence weakens firms’ strategic incentive to 
commit to overproduction.  Such commitment can only be obtained through the 
mechanism of employment protection, which is only present in Home. So, as product 
differentiation reduces strategic overproduction, the Home firm will be less willing to 
stay domestically anchored for the sake of the strategic advantages associated with it, 
and be more inclined to locate in Foreign for the flexibility advantages associated 
with that location choice.  In terms of Figure 3a, an increase in product differentiation 
will move the locus separating areas I and II inwards and downwards (in the limit 
case when e falls to zero, the 
*
2
F
σ -locus coincides with the faint locus, i.e., the 
threshold uncertainty level at which a monopolist Home firm is indifferent between 
locating in Home and in Foreign).  
 
Globalisation and strategic agglomeration   One of the defining characteristics of the 
current wave of globalisation is that large firms have become increasingly footloose. 
In our model this is captured by falling FDI-costs (δ ).  As δ  falls, other location 
equilibria, beside (H,F) and (F,F), start to emerge.  Figures 3b and 3c show the 
location pattern under quantity competition for increasing but incomplete and 
complete globalisation, respectively.  With increasing globalisation (i.e., ever lower 
δ ), it is easier for firms to invest abroad: hence, the cost to the Home firm of 
acquiring flexibility by investing in Foreign falls.  In Figure 3b, the threshold 
uncertainty locus below which the Home firm produces domestically (i.e., the 
negatively sloped curve) is now lower than in Figure 3a.  The area in which the Home 
firm is located in Home has shrunk (areas Ia and Ib in Figure 3b), meaning that 
domestic anchorage is less easily sustained, while FDI by the Home firm into the 
Foreign location becomes relatively more important.  This is reflected in an 
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enlargement of area II in Figure 3b, in which (F,F) is the unique equilibrium.  When 
low FDI costs are combined with low uncertainty, strategic considerations in the 
location decision become relatively more important. In fact, when uncertainty is low 
and the degree of employment protection in the Home location is high, even the 
Foreign firm will now find it worthwhile to pay the FDI costs and locate in Home.  In 
Figure 3b, this is shown by the appearance of another locus (which remained in the 
negative orthant at higher levels of FDI costs), along which the Foreign firm is 
indifferent between locating in Home or Foreign given that the Home firm is located 
in Home (defined by ( )*2
H
σ ).  Below this positively sloped locus, the Foreign firm 
produces in Home given that the Home firm produces there.  It is the relatively 
increased importance of strategic concerns that encourages inward FDI at the 
inflexible location, leading to the (H,H)-equilibrium (in area Ib in Figure 3b).  The 
Foreign firm actually has to jump a barrier and set up its plant in the Home location to 
avoid ending up in the worst possible strategic position ( HFHH ** θθ > , see expression 
(11b)).  The (H,H)-equilibrium is an example of strategic agglomeration, in the sense 
that this agglomeration would not occur in the absence of strategic behaviour.   
As globalisation deepens and δ  falls further, regions in which domestic 
anchorage prevails become smaller still.  In the limit, with complete globalisation 
( 0=δ ), firms effectively lose their nationality.  The loci from Figure 3b have now 
reversed their positions ( ( )*2
*
2
HF
σσ < ).  The resulting location patterns are shown 
in Figure 3c.  Even then, firms may want to locate in the inflexible Home location. In 
fact, at sufficiently low levels of uncertainty, (H,H) is the unique equilibrium under 
Cournot competition.   
The location effects of deepening globalisation prove to be qualitatively robust 
to changing degrees of product differentiation.  It is worth mentioning that as product 
differentiation increases (and 0>e  falls), strategic agglomeration still occurs, but at 
lower levels of uncertainty. 
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IV. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND LOCATION UNDER BERTRAND 
COMPETITION 
With Bertrand competition firms’ actions are now prices.  Nesting the case with 
Bertrand competition in the model outlined in section two requires inverting the 
demand system given in expressions (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b).  Thus, we obtain 
(13a) )( *111 eppq −−= βα  and  veppq +−−= )( *222 βα ,  
and   
(13b) )( 1
*
1
*
1 eppq −−= βα  and veppq +−−= )( 2*2*2 βα ,    
with )1/( ea +≡α , )1/(1 2e−≡β  and )1/( euv +≡ .  We assume 
},max{/ 1
*
1
*
11 eppepp −−≥βα  and },max{/)( 2*2*22 eppeppv −−≥+ βα , thus 
ensuring non-negative outputs in each period. 
 
Employment protection and price decisions 
As under Cournot competition, we first concentrate on the case in which each firm 
produces domestically (i.e., the (H,F)-case). 
Starting with the final stage of the game, the second-period price reaction 
functions are given by 
(14a)  ( ) ( ))2(/)1(),())(1( *2*1112 βλββλββλβαβλ +++−+++= peppqcvp , 
and    
(14b)  ( ) βββα 2/2*2 epcvp +++= ,       
for the Home and the Foreign firm respectively.  The Home firm’s price reaction 
function responds more to unexpected demand shocks than its rival’s (i.e., 
vpvp ∂∂>∂∂ // *22  from (14a) and (14b)).  Since the firm in Home is less flexible in 
output, unexpected demand shocks will be translated in larger price fluctuations.  For 
the same reason, the Home firm’s optimal second-period price is more responsive to 
changes in its rival’s price (or, 2/)2/()1( ee >++ βλβλ ). The Home firm’s past 
output level enters negatively in its second-period price reaction function.  As output 
is sticky in the presence of employment protection, a higher output in period one is 
associated with a higher output in period two and therefore with a lower price.  
Solving for second-period prices, we obtain: 
(15a)  
)]1()2(2[
2)]1(2[))(1)(2(
2
1
2 βλβλβ
βλββλαβλ
+−+
−++++++=
e
qcevep ,  
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and   
(15b)  
)]1()2(2[
)2())](1(2[
2
1*
2 βλβλβ
βλββλαβλ
+−+
−+++++++=
e
qeceveep .    
Inspection of (15a) and (15b) reveals that a high Home output in period one leads to 
low second-period prices for both firms.  Intuitively, with employment protection, a 
high Home output in period one will give rise to a high Home production level in 
period two, that will translate into low period-two prices for both the Home and – 
since prices are strategic complements – the Foreign firm.  Note that under Bertrand 
competition, the Home firm cannot choose its period-one output directly as 1q  
depends on the Home firm's first-period price and on that of its rival (see expression 
(13a)).  The dependence of second-period prices on both firms' period-one prices has 
important implications for firms’ price setting in period one, to which we now turn. 
In stage two, firms simultaneously set first-period prices, taking into account 
their effect on future prices.  For convenience, we rewrite the profit functions as: 
(16a)   ϕβαβαλ
βαβαπ
−+−−−−−−
+−−−+−−−=
2*
11
*
22
*
222
*
111
)])(())(()[2/(                   
])()[()]()[(
veppepp
veppcpeppcp , 
and  
(16b)   ϕβαβαπ −+−−−+−−−= ])()[()]()[( 2*2*21*1*1* veppcpeppcp  .  
Total differentiation of firms’ expected profits 
),,,,(),( *11
*
222
*
111 νπππ ppppEppE +=  and ),,(),( *22*2*11*1* νπππ ppEppE +=  
with respect to first-period prices yields the first-order conditions for period one.  
Since 0/ 22 =∂∂ pEπ  and 0/ *2*2 =∂∂ pEπ  (from the last stage), these are given by: 
(17a)   0
1
*
2
*
2
2
11
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂=
dp
dp
p
E
p
E
dp
dE πππ ,  
and      
(17b) 0*
1
2
2
*
2
*
1
*
*
1
*
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂=
dp
dp
p
E
p
E
dp
dE πππ .       
In the (H,F)-case, )/(// 12111 pEppE ∂∂+∂∂=∂∂ πππ  and *1*1*1* // ppE ∂∂=∂∂ ππ ; 
also, the strategic term in (17a) is positive ( 0)]/)(/[( 1
*
2
*
22 >∂∂ dpdppE π , as shown in 
table 1), which implies that the firm in Home strategically over-prices in period one 
( 0/ 1 <∂∂ pEπ ).  Unlike in the Cournot case, the firm in Foreign also has an incentive 
to behave strategically. That firm strategically under-prices (i.e., since 
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0)]/)(/[( *122
*
2 <∂∂ dpdppE π , as reported in Table 1, 0/ *1* >∂∂ pEπ  from (17b)).  
Furthermore, even though its output is fully flexible, the strategic effect (per unit of 
output) for the firm in Foreign is larger in absolute value than that for the firm in 
Home. 
The intuition for the strategic behaviour in the Bertrand case is quite subtle.  
Under Bertrand competition, a firm's strategic pricing in period one is aimed at 
increasing the future price of its rival’s product. This in turn raises its own second-
period profit. From expressions (15a) and (15b), we know that future prices can be 
pushed up by a low Home output level in period one.  Since firms choose prices, both 
firms can manipulate the Home firm's period-one output by choosing period-one 
prices strategically: the Home firm aims to keep 1q  low by increasing its product 
price, while the Foreign firm makes sure 1q  is kept low by selling its own product at a 
low price.  Each firm’s strategic pricing behaviour pushes up the Home firm's 
expected price in the next period and – because prices are strategic complements – 
also the Foreign firm's expected price in period two.  So, employment protection can 
act as a facilitating device for driving future expected prices up, even if only one firm 
is located in a country with employment protection laws and in spite of the fact that 
prices are chosen non-cooperatively.  
 So far, only the (H,F)-case has been discussed.  In the (F,H)-case, the Home 
firm (now located in the flexible Foreign location) will act strategically by under-
pricing in period one, while its Foreign rival (now located in Home and hence 
inflexible in output) will choose to over-price.  We find that the firm in the flexible 
location produces higher expected outputs and the firm in the inflexible location 
produces lower expected outputs than in the corresponding open-loop equilibrium.  
This contrasts with our Cournot results.  Under Bertrand, in (H,F) and (F,H) the 
market is more competitive in the first period but less competitive in the second 
period than in the open-loop case.  If both firms produce in Foreign, (F,F), neither 
firm sets prices strategically.  If both firms produce in Home, (H,H), then both firms 
will strategically under-price in period one (see Table 1): even though a concern for 
high future prices gives each firm an incentive to keep its first-period production low 
(by strategically over-pricing in period one), it creates an even greater incentive for 
firms to keep their rival’s first-period production low (by strategically under-pricing 
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in period one).24 Again, in this case − as in the Cournot case − our results are 
consistent with Jun and Vives (2004) results for the Markov perfect equilibrium under 
Bertrand competition.  Firms facing symmetric adjustment costs produce higher 
expected outputs and hence the equilibria are more competitive than in the open-loop 
equilibrium. 
 
Location pattern with employment protection 
We now turn to stage one, in which firms simultaneously choose their production 
location, taking into account how locations affect expected profits. Again, expected 
profits can be decomposed into fixed set-up costs, Φ , deterministic operating profits, 
θ , and the expected profit gains from the demand shocks, 2γσ . 
The ranking of the γ -parameter in the different location combinations is given 
by expressions (12a) and (12b) for the Home and the Foreign firm, respectively. Thus, 
although the actual values of the γ -parameter differ, the ranking is the same as under 
Cournot competition and the intuition is also the same.  
We now discuss the ranking of the θ -values when firms set prices.  As 
explained in the previous subsection, being inflexible encourages the rival firm to 
strategically under-price in period one in order to reduce the inflexible firm’s first-
period output and so raise its price in the future. This aggressive strategic behaviour 
by its rival hurts an inflexible firm’s operating profit.  Hence, when facing a flexible 
rival, firms have, from a purely strategic point of view, an incentive to favour the 
flexible over the inflexible location.  Formally, HFFF θθ > and FHFF ** θθ > and, 
provided λ is not too large, HHFH θθ > and HHHF ** θθ > (we will return to what 
happens when λ is large below).  Next, when comparing operating profits when both 
firms are in the inflexible location with those when both locate in the flexible foreign 
country, we have HHFF θθ > and HHFF ** θθ > ; this is because in ),( HH  both firms 
strategically under-price, resulting in lower prices in both periods (while there is no 
strategic price setting in ),( FF ).  Furthermore, we have HFHH θθ > , that is the 
                                                 
24 So, as in the Cournot case, firms strategically over-produce relative to the open loop. In (H,H) both 
firms experience output inflexibility and this lends to the model some features of Cournot competition.  
As pointed out by a referee, such Cournot elements are not unusual in multiple-stage games in which 
firms make decisions both about price and other variables (see, for instance, Lommerud-Sorgard 1997, 
in which firms first choose the number of product variants −a decision resembling a quantity choice−, 
then compete either à la Cournot or Bertrand). 
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inflexible (Home) firm’s deterministic operating profits are higher if the Foreign rival 
is inflexible too.  To understand why, recall that a firm always strategically under-
prices when it faces an inflexible rival.  Thus, the Foreign firm will under-price both 
at ),( HH  and ),( FH . However, its strategic aggressiveness, which harms the Home 
firm, will be strongest at ),( FH , when it is itself flexible. Naturally, this reasoning 
also implies FHHH ** θθ > .   Hence, given the above pair-wise rankings under 
Bertrand, we always have the following ranking of deterministic operating profits for 
the Home firm. 
(18a)  HFHHFF θθθ >> .          
Similarly, we have the following ranking for the Foreign firm 
(18b) FHHHFF *** θθθ >> .         
The position that FHθ and HF*θ take in these rankings depends on the level of λ .  In 
(F,H) and (H,F), the flexible firm strategically under-prices in period one to increase 
its profits in period two and it becomes increasingly aggressive in doing this the larger 
is λ.  This commitment to under-pricing in period one leads to a lower rival price in 
that period that hurts the flexible firm’s operating profit in these asymmetric cases. 
This becomes more serious the larger is λ.  Hence, we find that, as long as the degree 
of employment protection (λ) is not too high, FFFH θθ >  and FFHF ** θθ > , but, as λ 
increases, FHθ and HF*θ  fall and eventually, at very high λ, HHFH θθ < and 
HHHF ** θθ < . 
Again, since the analysis of firms’ location decisions involves many unwieldy 
algebraic expressions (formally derived in Appendix B), graphs are used to ease the 
exposition.  To enable direct comparison with the analysis under Cournot competition 
in subsection 4.2.1 above, we shall first focus on a situation in which firms incur a 
significant cost of FDI.  This allows us to examine the extent to which strategic 
behaviour affects domestic anchorage when firms compete in prices (subsection 
5.2.1). Second, we shall explore how increasing degrees of globalisation (in the form 
of falling values of δ) influences location patterns (subsection 5.2.2). 
 
Domestic de-anchorage  The location pattern under Bertrand competition for high 
FDI costs is shown in Figure 4a.  Along the solid locus (i.e., at 
*
22
F
σσ = ), the 
Home firm is indifferent between producing in Home and in Foreign.  The home firm 
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chooses to produce in Home in area I and to locate in Foreign in area II.  To enable 
comparison, the figure includes a dashed curve that represents the corresponding 
locus under Cournot competition (as depicted in Figure 3a) and a faint curve that 
represents the threshold uncertainty level at which a monopolist Home firm is 
indifferent between locating in Home and in Foreign (as depicted in Figure 2).25 
[Figures 4a, 4b and 4c about here] 
Given the same degree of product differentiation, competition is naturally tougher 
under Bertrand than under Cournot behaviour.26  Hence, price competition makes it 
harder for firms to carry the costs of FDI. Based on these considerations alone, one 
would therefore expect the area with domestic anchorage to be larger under Bertrand 
than under Cournot competition.  Indeed, if firms do not behave strategically in stage 
two (i.e., as in the open-loop benchmark), the area with domestic anchorage is larger 
under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.  However, it is clear from Figure 4a 
that the opposite is true: the region in which domestic anchorage occurs is larger 
under Cournot (the region under the dashed curve) than under Bertrand competition 
(the region under the solid curve).  This seemingly counterintuitive result can be 
explained by the strategic considerations underlying firms’ location decisions.  Under 
Bertrand competition, given its rival’s production in Foreign, the Home firm is, from 
a strategic point of view, better off when producing in Foreign ( BFF ),( in area II) 
than in Home ( HFFF θθ > , see expression (18a)).  By producing in Foreign, it avoids 
the massive first-period price undercutting by its rival that would occur if the Home 
firm were to produce in Home (this contrasts sharply with Cournot competition, 
where − as we saw earlier − the Home location holds strategic advantages).  Hence, 
under Bertrand, the Home firm has an additional incentive to leave the country with 
employment protection – to escape its rival’s harmful strategic pricing behaviour.  
Thus, there is a strategic de-anchorage effect when firms set prices. 
As product differentiation increases (i.e. as e falls), strategic behaviour and 
hence the reason for strategic de-anchorage is diminished.  As a result, the area in 
which ),( FH  is the equilibrium expands (while it shrinks under Cournot 
competition).  Importantly, the area in which the home firm stays at Home is always 
largest under Cournot behaviour. 
                                                 
25 In the figures, the maximum value for λ is limited to ensure the existence of all possible equilibria. 
26 This has been shown for one-shot oligopoly games (e.g., Dixon 1989). 
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Globalisation and strategic agglomeration   We now examine how the location 
pattern of firms changes as globalisation deepens.  Figures 4b and 4c show the 
location pattern under price competition for increasing but incomplete and complete 
globalisation, respectively.  
As δ  falls, the lower cost to the Home firm of acquiring flexibility by 
investing in Foreign is reflected in the 
*
2
F
σ -locus shifting closer towards the origin 
in Figure 4b.  Hence, the region in which the Home firm is located in Home has 
shrunk (area I in Figure 4b is smaller than area I in Figure 4a), meaning that domestic 
anchorage is even less easily sustained, while FDI from the Home firm into the 
Foreign location becomes relatively more important.  This is reflected in an 
enlargement of area II, in which (F,F) is the unique equilibrium. 
Figures 4b and 3b confirm our previous finding that domestic anchorage is 
strongest in industries characterised by Cournot behaviour: the region in which the 
Home firm produces in Home is larger under Cournot (areas Ia+Ib in Figure 3b) than 
under Bertrand (area I in Figure 4b).   
Under Bertrand competition, globalisation can, even at low levels of 
uncertainty, lead to FDI by the Home firm, as it tries to locate in the strategically 
favourable flexible Foreign location (resulting in (F,F)).  As shown in Figure 4b, 
provided that the level of employment protection in Home ( λ ) is sufficiently high, 
the (F,F)-equilibrium occurs even at certainty ( 02 =σ ); hence, strategic 
agglomeration can occur in Foreign. In this case, the Home firm is willing to incur the 
FDI-cost purely for strategic reasons ( HFFF θθ > , see expression (18a)).  This effect 
is so strong that, with complete globalisation ( 0=δ ), the Home firm never wants to 
locate in Home if the Foreign firm stays in Foreign (hence, the 
*
2
F
σ  -locus 
disappears from the positive orthant).  However, firms may want to locate in the 
inflexible Home location, given that the rival does the same (which is reflected 
diagrammatically in the appearance of the ( )*2
H
σ -locus).  In fact, (H,H) can be an 
equilibrium (together with (F,F)) under Bertrand competition, but only at very high 
degrees of employment protection.  This (H,H)-equilibrium is also an example of 
strategic agglomeration because, at high λ , HFHH ** θθ > : given that the Home firm 
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produces in Home, the Foreign firm sets up production in Home too, thus avoiding an 
unfavourable strategic position. 
So, whereas strategic agglomeration occurs only in the location with the 
inflexible labour market under Cournot competition, it can occur both in the location 
with the inflexible and in the one with the flexible labour market under Bertrand 
competition.  
The location effects of deepening globalisation prove to be qualitatively robust 
to changing degrees of product differentiation.  As product differentiation increases (e 
falls), strategic agglomeration still occurs, but only at lower levels of uncertainty. 
 
V.  EXTENSIONS 
In this section we explore the implications of modifying some of the assumptions of 
our model. Specifically, we discuss what would happen if firms were not to choose 
their locations simultaneously. We also briefly discuss ways in which trade costs 
could be incorporated into the model, as well as the implications of relaxing the 
implicit assumption that the discount factor is unity and how endogenous factor 
prices, either due to the presence of unions or general equilibrium effects, might be 
expected to alter the results. 
 
Sequential location choices 
In our analysis we have assumed that firms choose production locations 
simultaneously.  It is of theoretical interest, however, to explore how sequential 
location choices affect firm location patterns.  
When FDI-costs are high or intermediate (Figures 3a-3b and 4a-4b), the 
location pattern with sequential decisions is not different from the one observed under 
simultaneous decisions.27  When FDI-costs are low or non-existent (Figures 3c and 
4c), the location pattern changes slightly.  While nothing changes in the areas with a 
unique location outcome, only the (F,F)-equilibrium will survive in the regions with 
multiple equilibria (area II in Figure 3c and area I in Figure 4c).  The reason for this 
lies in the fact that the firm that moves first can "pick" the equilibrium in which its 
expected profits are highest.  From a pure flexibility perspective, each firm prefers 
agglomeration in Foreign to agglomeration in Home (from (12a) and (12b), 
                                                 
27 The reason for this is that, in each area of Figures 3a-b and 4a-b, the location choice of at least one 
firm is a dominant strategy. 
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HHFF γγ >  and HHFF ** γγ > ).  Furthermore, both firms also prefer (F,F) to (H,H) for 
strategic reasons, both under Cournot (from (11a) and (11b)) and under Bertrand 
competition (from (18a) and (18b)).  Hence, irrespective of which firm moves first, 
the equilibrium that emerges in the areas considered will always be (F,F).  Hence, in a 
completely globalised world, sequential location decisions work against 
agglomeration in Home.  Note, however, that strategic agglomeration in the Home 
country is not completely eliminated when location decisions are made sequentially: 
(H,H) remains the unique location outcome in area I of Figure 3c.  
 
Trade costs 
In our analysis we have chosen not to model trade costs explicitly given our aim to 
focus on how the location decision is affected by differences in local labour markets. 
This flexibility factor can be seen in sharper relief when we abstract from trade-cost 
jumping reasons for doing FDI. Our approach follows other related papers in the 
employment protection and FDI literature, in particular those of Haaland et al (2002) 
and Haaland and Wooton (2007), in assuming that the firms sell on to a single 
integrated market, such as could exist in a customs union.28  In such a scenario, even 
though the market for the final good is integrated, countries’ labour market 
institutions differ − as is indeed the case between EU member states.  The model 
could clearly be extended to take account of non-integrated final goods markets, 
separated by trade costs. A natural way to do this would be to employ the reciprocal 
markets framework, first pioneered by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman 
(1983). Clearly, incorporating trade costs and market segmentation in this manner into 
our model would overlay a proximity-concentration trade-off  on the existing 
flexibility-commitment trade-off . However, doing so would have the drawback of 
adding considerably to the complexity of the model without necessarily providing 
many interesting additional insights as can be obtained from studying the two issues 
separately.  Basically, firms would export rather than do FDI when trade costs are 
relatively low and FDI costs are relatively high, whereas they would do FDI when the 
relative FDI costs are low enough.  The parameter values (trade costs and FDI costs) 
at which they will switch would depend on the degree of employment protection, the 
degree of uncertainty and the mode of competition. However, qualitatively, the 
                                                 
28 This assumption is also typical of the strategic trade policy literature. 
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manner in which these employment protection and flexibility factors affect location 
will be analogous to how they affect location in our model with integrated markets.  
 
The discount factor 
We have implicitly assumed that the firms do not discount future profits, i.e., the 
discount factor is unity.  Lower levels of the discount factor lead to a reduction in 
strategic behaviour as the strategic actions are taken in the first period but reap 
benefits only in the second. Thus, for instance, the first-order condition for a quantity 
setting firm located in the inflexible location that was given in (10a) becomes 
0
1
*
2
*
2
2
11
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂=
dq
dq
q
E
q
E
dq
dE πρππ , where the discount factor is represented by ρ . 
As ρ  falls towards zero, all the θ -values under Cournot converge since the 
differences between these depend only on strategic behaviour.  Likewise, all the 
Bertrand θ -values get closer to each other as the value of ρ  falls. The benefits of 
flexibility also accrue in the second period and so the γ -values all go to zero as ρ  
goes to zero. Since the setup costs − including the FDI costs − are incurred upfront in 
period one, these become relatively more important in determining location when the 
discount factor is lower. When the discount factor goes to zero, issues of flexibility 
and commitment disappear and firms then locate in their own country to minimise 
setup costs. 
 
Endogenous factor prices 
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the marginal cost of production (c) is 
constant and the same in both locations.  In doing so, we have abstracted from general 
equilibrium effects on factor prices as well as the possibility of wages being set in a 
union-bargaining framework.  
The partial equilibrium approach that we follow in this paper – in line with 
most of the oligopoly literature – can be justified by seeing firms as small relative to 
the size of the factor market and the economy as a whole, even though they are large 
in their particular industry. Although our model is already too complex to be nested in 
a general equilibrium framework29, it is nevertheless worthwhile to briefly discuss 
                                                 
29 There are as yet few papers that model oligopoly in general equilibrium, with Neary’s GOLE 
framework being a notable exception (see Neary 2009). 
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how general equilibrium effects on factor prices might affect the results. As we show, 
agglomeration equilibria ((H,H) or (F,F)) can emerge. In a general equilibrium 
setting, such agglomeration in one country would likely cause factor prices in that 
country to rise, as shown in the economic geography literature.30  Higher factor prices 
in a particular location would make it less attractive; that is, they would work as a 
countervailing force, dampening the degree of agglomeration somewhat.  By ignoring 
such general equilibrium effects and focussing instead on the behaviour of firms 
within industries we are able to bring out the effects of strategic interaction in the 
clearest possible way. 
We have also abstracted from the role of unions in this paper.  If employment 
protection is strengthened, union wages may increase in countries with strong unions, 
in which case the potential strategic advantage associated with strict employment 
protection would be mitigated by the strategic disadvantage implied by high wages.  
However, it is by no means certain that this scenario is the most likely one.   Leonardi 
and Pica (2007) present evidence that, with strict employment protection and union 
wage bargaining, firms make workers prepay the severance cost.  Thus, even in the 
presence of unions, increases in employment protection do not necessarily imply 
higher wages. Modelling the possible interaction between employment protection and 
wages would be important if we were to derive the optimal level of employment 
protection.  This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have explored how differences in labour market flexibility affect location 
decisions when future demand is uncertain and firms act strategically.  When demand 
uncertainty is high, firms will cluster in countries where the labour market is 
relatively flexible, thus avoiding costly redundancy packages during economic 
slowdowns and expensive overtime payments or hiring costs in economic booms.   
However, when firms act strategically, they may be willing to forego 
flexibility and produce in countries where the labour market is relatively inflexible in 
order to obtain strategic advantages.  This is the case when the firms engage in 
Cournot behaviour.  Under quantity competition an inflexible location allows a firm 
to commit to high future output, which makes the inflexible location more attractive at 
                                                 
30 See, for instance, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). 
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low levels of uncertainty.  This strategic advantage helps to maintain domestic 
anchorage of firms in locations with strict labour regulations.  Under price 
competition however, a firm located in the inflexible country faces aggressive pricing 
from its flexible rival in period one. As a result, the inflexible location is unfavourable 
both from a strategic and a flexibility perspective.  Hence, both strategic and 
flexibility incentives work against domestic anchorage under Bertrand competition.  
We have shown that deepening globalisation can lead to a greater tendency for 
the development of strategic agglomeration. This is the case under both Cournot and 
Bertrand competition.  Under Cournot competition, firms facing low FDI-costs cluster 
in the inflexible location when uncertainty is low. Such clustering has however a 
prisoner’s dilemma character, with firms all producing higher output and enjoying 
less flexibility than they would in a location with lower labour adjustment costs. 
Under Bertrand competition, this can also occur, but only at very high levels of 
employment protection and when uncertainty is very low.  In fact, when strategic 
agglomeration occurs under price competition, it does so mainly in the flexible 
location as firms flee the strategically unfavourable inflexible location.  
When formulating policy lessons from this analysis, one should proceed with 
caution.  We have not derived optimal employment protection levels in this paper, nor 
have we allowed for a link between employment protection and firms’ marginal costs 
– as might exist if, by strengthening workers’ bargaining power employment 
protection results in higher wages. Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the 
level of employment protection is exogenous.  This is a reasonable assumption since 
the political reluctance to change employment protection regulations, once these are 
in place, is often strong.  It does not, however, preclude policy makers from using 
location-dependent fiscal incentives to increase the attractiveness of their region.  Our 
analysis suggests that countries with strict labour regulations will find it less difficult 
to achieve domestic anchorage of key industries, by using fiscal incentives, when firm 
behaviour is approximated by Cournot rather than by Bertrand competition.31  Thus, 
                                                 
31 Whether firms’ behaviour is better described by Cournot or by Bertrand competition is a matter for 
empirical investigation on an industry-by-industry basis.  There exists a substantial empirical literature 
on this issue (for a survey, see Martin (2002), Ch.7). 
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we have highlighted a potentially important additional channel through which 
employment protection might affect location incentives, which may strengthen in 
some circumstances the effectiveness of other policies aimed at increasing the 
attractiveness of a region to investors.  In so doing, the paper points to a potentially 
fruitful empirical agenda. 
Different labour market policies are typically studied in isolation and this 
paper is no exception. However, as evidenced by current debates about flexicurity, 
employment protection and unemployment insurance are tightly linked – with the 
OECD (2005) and the European Commission (2010) endorsing reforms (along the 
lines of those that have taken place in Denmark and, with some variations, in Austria 
and the Netherlands) that accompany reductions in the levels of hiring and firing 
restrictions with the provision of security to the unemployed (such as good 
unemployment insurance). The theoretical literature in this area is still in its infancy. 
Among the notable exceptions are Blanchard and Tirole (2008), and Lommerud and 
Straume (2011) – which includes a valuable survey of the limited literature in the 
area. The implications of introducing a flexicurity-type policy mix in our model 
would depend on how the unemployment benefits that replace employment protection 
are paid for. State funded unemployment benefits will eliminate the inflexibility 
mechanism highlighted in this paper. However, as shown by Blanchard and Tirole 
(2008), who examine theoretically the joint determination of unemployment benefits 
and employment protection, a first-best policy entails financing unemployment 
benefits by layoff taxes on firms. Although, in the absence of general equilibrium 
effects as is the case in our paper, the introduction of such a policy mix should not 
alter the qualitative nature of our results, this remains a promising direction for future 
research.  
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APPENDIX A - DECOMPOSITION OF MAXIMISED EXPECTED PROFITS 
Under Cournot competition 
First, consider the (H,F)-case.  The first-order conditions for second- and first-period 
outputs chosen by the Home firm ((7a) and (10a), respectively) can be rewritten as: 
(A.1) HFHFHFHF qqqcp 2122 )()( =−−− λ , 
and     
(A.2) HFHFHFHFHFHF qEqqEqcp 12121 )()( =+−+− λξλ ,   
with  
HFHF e Δ≡ /2ξ  and 2)2(2 eHF −+≡Δ λ .   
Multiplying both sides of (A.1) by HFq2  and both sides of (A.2) by 
HFq1 , we obtain: 
(A.3) 2221222 )()()(
HFHFHFHFHFHF qqqqqcp =−−− λ , 
and    
(A.4)  211211211 )()()(
HFHFHFHFHFHFHFHFHF qqEqqqEqqcp =+−+− λξλ . 
Adding (A.3) and (A.4) and rearranging terms, we obtain: 
(A.5) 
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From (9a) and (A.5) follows: 
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Since 2
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2 var)()( qEqqE +=  (and 22
2
2 )(
)2(var σHFHF eq Δ
−= ), we can write expected 
profits in the (H,F)-case as: 
(A.7) 2σγθπ HFHFHFE += ,       
with 
HFHFHFHFHFHF qEqEqq 12
2
2
2
1 )1(])()[(2
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Following a similar procedure to obtain the maximised expected profit decomposition 
for the Foreign firm, expected Foreign profits can be written as: 
(A.8) ϕσγθπ −+= 2*** HFHFHFE ,      
with  
2*
2
2*
1
* )()( HFHFHF Eqq +≡θ  and 22
2
*
)(
)2( σλγ HFHF eΔ
+−≡ . 
Equilibrium first-period and expected second-period outputs for both firms are found 
by solving (8a),(8b), (10a) and (10b). 
The decomposition of firms' expected profits in terms of θ , 2γσ  and Φ  for (H,H), 
(F,H) and (F,F) is obtained from a procedure that is similar to the one outlined for the 
(H,F)-case.  Table A.1 reports the θ - and γ -expressions for the Home firm for each 
location combination under Cournot competition.  The corresponding expressions for 
the Foreign firm are then easily obtained given that firms are ex-ante symmetric in 
everything except nationality: δππ −= HHHH EE * , δππ += FHHF EE * , 
δππ −= HFFH EE *  and δππ += FFFF EE * . 
[Table A.1 about here] 
Under Bertrand competition 
Again, we first derive the θ - and γ -expressions for the (H,F)-case.  The first-order 
conditions for second- and first-period prices chosen by the Home firm ((14a) and 
(17a), respectively) can be rewritten as: 
(A.9) HFHFHFHF qqqcp 2122 )()( =−−− βλβ , 
and 
(A.10) HFHFHFHFHFHF qEqqEqcp 12121 )()( =−−+− βλζβλβ ,  
with  
HFHF e ∇≡ /2ζ  and )1()2(2 2 βλβλ +−+≡∇ eHF .   
Multiplying both sides of (A.9) by HFq2  and both sides of (A.10) by 
HFq1 , we obtain: 
(A.11) 2221222 )()()(
HFHFHFHFHFHF qqqqqcp =−−− βλβ , 
and 
(A.12) 211211211 )()()(
HFHFHFHFHFHFHFHFHF qqEqqqEqqcp =−−+− βλζβλβ . 
Adding (A.11) and (A.12) and rearranging terms, we obtain: 
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(A.13) 
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From (16a) and (A.13) follows: 
(A.14) 
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expected profits in the (H,F)-case as: 
(A.15) ϕσγθπ −+= 2HFHFHFE ,      
with 
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Substituting (15a), (15b), (17a) and (17b) into expression (13a) yields optimal output 
levels in period one and two for the Home firm. 
Following a similar procedure, to obtain the maximised expected profit 
decomposition for the Foreign firm, expected Foreign profits can be written as: 
(A.16)  ϕσγθπ −+= 2*** HFHFHFE ,       
with  
HFHFHFHFHFHF qEqEqq *1
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βλγ . 
The decomposition of firms' expected profits in terms of θ , 2γσ  and Φ for 
(H,H), (F,H) and (F,F) is obtained from a similar procedure.  Table A.1, reports the 
θ - and γ -expressions for each location combination under Bertrand competition. 
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APPENDIX B - DETERMINING THE LOCATION OUTCOMES 
Crucial for solving the first stage of the game (in which firms choose locations) are 
the “location indifference” thresholds: for a given λ  we calculate the critical 2σ -
level at which a firm is indifferent between locations given the location of its rival.   
So, if the Foreign firm chooses the Foreign location, the critical “location-indifferent” 
2σ -level for the Home firm is given by the 2σ -level at which FFHF EE ππ = .  Since 
ϕσγθπ −+= 2HFHFHFE  and )(2 δϕσγθπ +−+= FFFFFFE , the critical 
uncertainty threshold is HFFF
FFHF
F γγ
δθθσ −
+−≡
*
2 .  For 
*
22
F
σσ > , FFHF EE ππ < , 
hence the Home firm will locate in Foreign, given the Foreign firm’s location in 
Foreign.  For 
*
22
F
σσ < , FFHF EE ππ > , hence the Home firm will produce in 
Home. 
There is another critical location-indifferent 2σ -level for the Home firm, that 
is, the 2σ -level at which FHHH EE ππ = , denoted by HHFH
FHHH
H γγ
δθθσ −
+−≡
*
2 .  If the 
Foreign firm produces in Home, the Home firm also produces in Home for 
*
22
H
σσ <  but locates in Foreign for 
*
22
H
σσ > . 
Similar thresholds exist for the Foreign firm.  These are given by 
( ) FHFF FFFHF ** ***2 γγ δθθσ − −−≡  and ( ) HHHF HFHHH ** ***2 γγ δθθσ − −−≡ . 
While these four thresholds are important in deriving firms’ location choices, 
not all of them are binding in determining the actual location equilibrium.  
 
The location pattern under Cournot competition 
In Figure 3a, FDI costs are so that ( ) 0*2 <
F
σ  and ( ) 0*2 <
H
σ  for all values of λ ;  
the Foreign firm therefore produces in Foreign.  If the Foreign firm locates in Foreign, 
the 
*
2
F
σ -threshold −depicted in ( λσ ,2 )-space− will be crucial in determining the 
location equilibria; it is the locus demarcating areas I and II.  So, FFHF EE ππ >  in 
area I, implying that (H,F) is the location equilibrium in that area.  In area II, 
FFHF EE ππ < , which means that (F,F) is the location equilibrium. 
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As δ  falls, location of the Foreign firm in the Home country becomes a 
possibility (see Figures 3b and 3c).  While δ  is still high enough so that  ( ) 0*2 <
F
σ  
for all λ -values, at sufficiently high values of λ  we have ( ) 0*2 >
H
σ .  Given a 
Home location by the Foreign firm, to determine the location of the Home firm the 
*
2
H
σ -threshold is relevant.  The ranking of the relevant thresholds is 
( )
*
2
*
2*2
FHH
σσσ <<  (note that 
*
2
H
σ  is not depicted in Figure 3b).  For 
( )*22
H
σσ >  (areas Ia and II), the Foreign firm produces in Foreign, irrespective of 
what the Home firm does.  Given that the Foreign firm produces in Foreign, the Home 
firm produces in Foreign if FFHF EE ππ <  − that is, for 
*
22
F
σσ >  (area II) − and 
locates in Home if FFHF EE ππ >  − that is for 
*
22
F
σσ <  (areas Ia and Ib).  Hence, 
the equilibrium in area II is (F,F), while (H,F) is the outcome in area Ia.  For 
( )*22
H
σσ <  (area Ib), the Foreign firm locates in Home, but only if the Home firm 
does too. Given the ranking of the relevant 2σ -thresholds, we know that in area Ib the 
Home firm always produces in Home ( FFHF EE ππ >  and FHHH EE ππ > ), hence 
(H,H) is the unique equilibrium in area Ib. 
With complete globalisation, i.e. δ = 0  (Figure 3c), firms effectively lose their 
nationality and become ex ante identical.  Hence, ( )*2
*
2
HH
σσ =  and 
( )*2
*
2
FF
σσ = .  Unlike in Figure 3b, the 
*
2
F
σ -locus now lies below the 
*
2
H
σ -
locus.  Producing in Foreign is now a dominant strategy for each firm in area III (for 
*
22
H
σσ > , FFHF EE ππ <  and FHHH EE ππ < ), while locating in Home is a 
dominant strategy for each firm in area I (for 
*
22
F
σσ < , FFHF EE ππ >  and 
FHHH EE ππ > ).  For 
*
22
*
2
HF
σσσ ≤≤ , FHHH EE ππ >  , but FFHF EE ππ < ; 
hence, (H,H) and (F,F) are the location equilibria in area II.   
 
 
 37
The location pattern under Bertrand competition 
In Figure 4a, the Foreign firm never locates in Home as we assumed the FDI-costs are 
too high.  Along the 
*
2
F
σ -locus, the Home firm is indifferent between locating in 
Home or Foreign.  For 
*
22
F
σσ < ,  and hence (H,F) is the location equilibrium in 
area I; since FFHF EE ππ <  in are II, (F,F) is the unique outcome in that area. 
As FDI-costs fall, the location pattern under Bertrand competition remains 
qualitatively the same, which is obvious from comparing Figure 4a and 4b (Figure 4b 
only differs from Figure 4a in the size of area I, which has shrunk).  
With complete globalisation, i.e. δ = 0 (Figure 4c), ( )*2
*
2
FF
σσ =  turns 
negative for all λ -values, while ( )*2
*
2
HH
σσ =  remains negative for low λ -values 
but turns positive when λ  is sufficiently high.  Hence, in Figure 4c, (F,F) and (H,H) 
are the location outcomes in area I (where FHHH EE ππ >  and FFHF EE ππ < ), while 
(F,F) is the unique location equilibrium elsewhere (at ( )*2
*
22
HH
σσσ =>  −that is, in 
area II−, FHHH EE ππ <  and FFHF EE ππ < ). 
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Figure 1: The sequence of decisions
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Figure 2: The location pattern of a monopolist from the Home country 
( =0.01; e=0; A=1)
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Figure 3a: The location pattern under Cournot competition: High FDI-costs 
( =0.01; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 3b: The location pattern under Cournot competition with increased globalisation: 
Intermediate FDI-costs (δ =0.005; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 3c: The location pattern under Cournot competition with complete globalisation:
No FDI-costs (δ =0; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 4b: The location pattern under Bertrand competition with increased 
globalisation: Intermediate FDI-costs (=0.005; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 4a: The location pattern under Bertrand competition: High FDI-costs 
( =0.01; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 4c: The location pattern under Bertrand competition with complete globalisation:
No FDI-costs (δ =0; e=0.75; A=1)
I: (H,H);(F,F)
II: (F,F)
( ) HFHH
H
EE **
*2 : ππσ =
 
Table A.1: Decomposition of maximised expected profits for the Home firm 
MONOPOLY )0( =e  
Location H F 
πE  ϕσγθ −+ 2HH  )(2 δϕσγθ +−+ FF  
θ  2
2
2
1 )()( Eqq +  γ  )]2(2/[1 λ+  4/1  
OLIGOPOLY )10( << e  
Location 
combination 
(H,H) (H,F) (F,H) (F,F) 
πE  ϕσγθ −+ 2HHHH  ϕσγθ −+ 2HFHF  )(2 δϕσγθ +−+ FHFH  )(2 δϕσγθ +−+ FFFF  
COURNOT 
 
θ  [ ]
HHHHHH
HHHH
qEq
Eqq
12
2
2
2
1
)1(              
)()(
2
1
λξ
λ
+−
+

 +
 
[ ]
HFHFHF
HFHF
qEq
Eqq
12
2
2
2
1
)1(              
)()(
2
1
λξ
λ
+−
+

 +
 
2
2
2
1 )()(
FHFH Eqq +  2221 )()( FFFF Eqq +  
 γ  2
2
)(
)2(
2
1 HH
e
∆
+−

 + λλ  
2
2
)(
)2(
2
1 HF
e
∆
−

 + λ  
2
2
)(
)2(
FH
e
∆
+− λ
 2)2(
1
e+  
BERTRAND 
 
θ  [ ]
HHHHHH
HHHH
qEq
Eqq
12
2
2
2
1
)1(              
)()(
2
1
λζ
λ
β
−−
+


 +
 
[ ]
HFHFHF
HFHF
qEq
Eqq
12
2
2
2
1
)1(              
)()(
2
1
λζ
λ
β
−−
+


 +
 
[ ]
FHFHFH
FHFH
qEq
Eqq
12
2
2
2
1
              
)()(
1
λζ
β
+
+
 
[ ]2221 )()(1 FFFF Eqq +β  
 γ  22 ))1(2()1(
1
2
1
βλβλ
λ
β +−++

 +
ee
 
22
2
)()1(
)2(
2
1
HFe
e
∇+
+

 + λβ  22
2
)()1(
])1(2[1
FHe
ee
∇+
+++ βλ
β  22 )2()1(
11
ee −+β  
Note: HHHH e ∆≡ /2ξ ; HFHF e ∆≡ /2ξ ; 22)2( eHH −+≡∆ λ ; 2)2(2 eFHHF −+≡∆=∆ λ ; HHHH e ∇−≡ /2ζ ; HFHF e ∇≡ /2ζ ;  
          FHFH e ∇−≡ /2 2ζ ; 222 )1()2( βλβλ +−+≡∇ eHH ; )1()2(2 2 βλβλ +−+≡∇=∇ eFHHF . 
